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Opinion
PARADISE POSTPONED
Allan C. Hutchinson
Andrew Petter
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews
v. Law Society of British Columbia has been greeted with
considerable rejoicing. Many commentators have given the
distinct impression that just over the judicial horizon lies the
promised land of a truly egalitarian society. Presented with
the right kinds of cases, the courts can now usher the have-
nots into the privileged ranks of the haves. Catherine
MacKinnon, for example, has called the decision "superb",
claiming that it "offers the possibility of addressing some of
the deepest roots of social inequality of the sexes". While
this is a tantalizing prospect, unfortunately it is far from
realistic.
The Andrews case concerned the right of non-citizens to
practise law in British Columbia. A majority of the Court
held that the Charter gave them this right. The importance
of the decision, however, lies in its pronouncements on
equality.
Although the Charter lists clearly the rights to which people
are entitled, their meaning is far from clear. Charter rights,
like those to equality, are characterized by their indetermina-
cy: they mean different things to different people at differ-
ent times. They are like empty sacks that cannot stand up
until they are filled with political content.
Some in society want to fill the equality sack with a formal
vision of equality that demands that all individuals be treated
equally. Others urge a substantive vision of equality that
looks to ensure that all individuals are made equal in their
condition. These alternative visions are not only distinct, but
potentially contradictory. How can the disadvantaged be
made equal in condition to the advantaged if both groups
must be treated alike? Thus while women's rights groups
invoke a substantive vision of equality to support special
programs for women, men's rights groups invoke a formal
vision of equality to attack special programs for women.
The strength of the Supreme Court's decision is that it
recognized the open-ended nature of equality rights and took
steps to limit the use of those rights by corporations and
other powerful interests. However, in Charter matters, it
remains the case that behind every silver lining there lurks
a cloud.
Speaking for the Court, Justice McIntyre set out a three-step
approach to equality claims:
" First, complainants must show that legislation treats
them differently or affects them adversely. Yet not
every difference in treatment qualifies for Charter
protection. Protection is limited to differences relat-
ing to an enumerated Charter ground -- "race, nation-
al or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability" -- or to analogous grounds, like
citizenship, "which involve prejudice or disadvantage".
" Second, complainants must show that the distinction
or adverse effect is "discriminatory": that it imposes
burdens or withholds benefits based on grounds
relating to personal characteristics of an individual or
group. "Distinctions based upon personal characteris-
tics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of
association with a group will rarely escape the charge
of discrimination, while those based on an individual's
merits and capacities will rarely be so classed."
" Third, a discriminatory law will survive Charter
scrutiny if it represents a "reasonable limit" on equality
rights within the meaning of section 1. The onus for
satisfying this standard rests with those seeking to
uphold the law, usually governments.
What does all of this amount to? In particular, what does it
mean for the disadvantaged? The restriction of equality
rights to enumerated and analogous grounds of discrimina-
tion is undoubtedly a positive development. Corporations
and others are unlikely to be able to bring equality claims
attacking all manner of regulatory distinctions. But the
remainder of the decision is so strewn with uncertainties and
contradictions that, like the concept of equality itself, it can
be made to stand for virtually any proposition that one
wants.
For example, some have interpreted the second requirement
as restricting the benefit of equality rights to members of
socially disadvantaged groups. According to this interpretat-
ion, men would be unable to invoke gender equality to
challenge special programs for women; whites would be
unable to rely upon racial equality to attack legislation
favouring natives. Yet it is not clear that this is what the
Court is saying. To be sure, there is plenty of rhetoric about
"disadvantage". However, the actual definition of discrimina-
tion adopted by McIntyre J. suggests that real disadvantage
need not be shown in order to bring an equality rights claim.
A formal disadvantage flowing from a legislative distinction
may be enough.
Underlying this ambiguity is the fact that, while McIntyre J.
purports to reject an Aristotlean conception of equality (one
that requires that likes be treated alike and unalikes be
treated differently), the division he embraces between
"distinctions based upon personal characteristics" and those
based upon "merits and capacities" is little more than a
vacuous restatement of Aristotle's formula. Indeed, it was
Aristotle who argued that equality requires "that awards
should be 'according to merit' "
The confusion is further heightened by a disagreement within
the Court concerning the application of section 1. While
Justice McIntyre was prepared to uphold the citizenship
requirement as a "reasonable limit" on equality rights, the
majority of judges were not. They struck the requirement
down.
In short, while the case is helpful in limiting the scope of
equality rights, it is singularly unhelpful in defining what
those rights mean. On this key issue, the decision is a
masterpiece of obfuscation. Equality means whatever future
judges want it to mean.
On at least one point, however, the Court is all too clear.
Although ignored by most commentators, it is a point whose
painful effects the disadvantaged and underprivileged will
recognize and continue to experience. The Court's decision
is premised on the assumption that the Charter is concerned
only with inequalities that can be linked to some legislative
source.
Justice McIntyre insists that "discriminatory measures having
the force of law" constitute the "evil" against which the
Charter's equality guarantee is directed. The Charter "does
not provide for equality between individuals or groups within
society in a general or abstract sense, nor does it impose on
individuals or groups an obligation to accord equal treatment
of others".
In other words, oppression and inequality that flow from
private conduct or from the seemingly natural operation of
the market economy, lie beyond the scope of the Charter's
remedies. By implication, the Charter places no obligation
on governments to take positive measures to redress such
inequalities. The underlying disparities in wealth and power
that are the root cause of social inequality and the systemic
practices that reinforce them remain safely hidden from
Charter scrutiny.
At best, the courts will grapple with the symptoms, but not
the causes, of widespread inequality in Canada. But how
could it be any different? The courts have served too long
as the guardians of our private property regime to be
transformed into the instigators of its reform. Moreover, the
operation and legitimacy of the judicial system is itself
predicated on an assumption of formal equality. What kind
of equality guarantee should we expect from a system that
requires one to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars just
to have one's equality claim decided by courts?
Measured against these realities, the decision of the Supreme
Court is not nearly as disheartening as the reaction to it.
The fact that the media and legal observers can hail as a
victory for the disadvantaged an ambiguous judicial ruling
allowing an American to practice law in Canada offers a sad
commentary on the state of contemporary political sensibi-
lites. At best, the decision will serve as a weak judicial
shield against blatant attacks on progressive and egalitarian-
minded legislation -- legislation that is only susceptible to
challenge in the first place because of the Charter.
The homeless and disadvantaged will not be part of such
celebrations. They will have to remain on the outside
looking in for some time yet. If they are invited to share in
the festivities, it is unlikely to be by the courts. Besides,
even if a judicial invitation were issued, who among them
could afford to attend?
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